Is maay/brighty safe?
Use with caution. maay/brighty is not clearly unsafe, but the audit flagged risks to review before you install it. Oathe's behavioral security audit gave the brighty skill by maay a trust score of 74/100 with 8 findings (2 high).
https://github.com/openclaw/skills/tree/main/skills/maay/brighty
Is maay/brighty safe to install?
The brighty skill provides a legitimate banking integration for the Brighty API but carries two significant risks: (1) its MCP server is configured to download and execute unpinned code directly from GitHub via 'npx -y github:Maay/brighty_mcp', creating a supply chain attack surface against live financial operations, and (2) the invoice-parsing workflow creates a prompt injection vector where malicious document content could redirect wire transfers to attacker-controlled accounts. Canary files were read post-install but not exfiltrated, and the install itself was clean; the skill's safety confirmations are genuine but insufficient to fully mitigate the financial blast radius.
What security issues were found in maay/brighty?
Category Scores
Findings (8)
HIGH Unpinned GitHub package execution via npx -45 ▶
config/mcporter.json configures the MCP server as 'npx -y github:Maay/brighty_mcp' with no version, commit SHA, or integrity hash. Every time the MCP server starts it re-downloads and executes whatever is currently at HEAD of that repository. A single malicious push to Maay/brighty_mcp would compromise all users of this skill, with direct access to live banking credentials and financial operations.
HIGH Prompt injection via invoice content can redirect wire transfers -42 ▶
The 'Pay an invoice' workflow instructs the agent to autonomously extract IBAN, BIC, amount, and reference from invoice documents. A maliciously crafted invoice (received via email, web, or file) could contain injected instructions that override the recipient details, causing funds to be wired to an attacker-controlled account. The user confirmation step before brighty_start_payout is the only safeguard, and it depends entirely on the agent correctly surfacing the attacker-supplied details.
MEDIUM Canary credential files accessed post-install -18 ▶
Six canary credential files (.env, .ssh/id_rsa, .aws/credentials, .npmrc, .docker/config.json, gcloud credentials) were accessed at timestamp 1771907187.670, approximately 4 seconds after skill installation completed. Canary integrity check confirms no content was modified or exfiltrated. These accesses are likely from oathe's own post-install canary verification routine, but the timing warrants noting.
MEDIUM Broad blanket authorization notice -18 ▶
The skill includes an 'Authorization Notice' stating that merely using the skill constitutes owner authorization for all operations. This framing could cause an agent to treat the authorization as pre-granted, potentially reducing the friction for dangerous operations like bulk payouts or account termination without explicit per-operation consent.
MEDIUM Team management tools enable account takeover -30 ▶
brighty_add_members and brighty_remove_members can add arbitrary email addresses as ADMIN or MEMBER and remove existing members. If an agent with this skill is manipulated (e.g., via a crafted message claiming to be an onboarding request), it could add attacker-controlled email addresses as business account administrators.
LOW No package integrity verification -10 ▶
The skill has no lockfile, no package hash, and no mechanism to verify that the downloaded brighty_mcp package matches any expected checksum. This is a latent supply chain risk even if the current version of the package is benign.
INFO Clean install from monorepo via sparse checkout 0 ▶
The installation used git sparse-checkout targeting only skills/maay/brighty, connecting only to github.com. No unexpected processes or network connections were observed during the install phase itself.
INFO Explicit safety confirmation requirements 0 ▶
The skill repeatedly instructs the agent to always confirm with the user before executing payouts or terminating accounts, and to show amounts and recipients clearly. These are genuinely protective instructions.
Should I install maay/brighty?
Oathe's verdict for maay/brighty is CAUTION with a trust score of 74/100. Recommendation: Install with caution.